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BRIDGE-BUILDERS OR BRIDGEHEADS IN BRUSSELS? 
THE WORLD OF SECONDED NATIONAL EXPERTS 
 
By Semin Suvarierol and Caspar van den Berg1
 
5.1 Living and breathing the Brussels bureaucracy 
 
The foregoing chapters of this book have demonstrated the extent to which national 
civil servants are involved in EU-related activities, and the dynamics of national 
administrative activities in the context of the EU. This chapter shifts the focus from 
national civil servants working on the European Union to national civil servants 
working for the European Union. This is a class of national civil servants for whom 
finding a balance between national and European interests in their work is a 
permanent, although sometimes implicit feature of their daily professional activities.  
The duality of national and European roles is perhaps the most exacerbated for the 
seconded national experts (SNEs), i.e. national civil servants who are temporarily 
working for EU institutions, in particular those seconded to the European 
Commission.2 On the one hand, Commission SNEs have to be loyal to the 
Commission and represent European interests in this supranational organ of the EU. 
On the other hand, their employer is still the member-state government, and they are 
expected to return to their home organization after their secondment term ends. The 
SNEs are thus practically torn between two employers: their daily employer under 
whose supervision they work (the Commission) and the national employer who sent 
them on the secondment and continues to pay their salaries (the member-state). 
Besides these atypical terms of employment, SNEs also form a particular 
group of European civil servants in terms of their position at a crossing point of 
European and national governance at the micro-level. This key position stems mainly 
from their presence in the beginning phase of the EU legislative process by working 
for the Commission. As it has been argued in Chapter 3, SNEs are potentially key 
strategic weapons for the member-states in maneuvering policy proposals. 
Conversely, SNEs are key resources for the Commission to sound out the 
acceptability of a particular proposal for a given member-state. This reciprocal gain, 
however, can only work if there is an ongoing flow of information between the 
Commission and the member-state through the SNE. By virtue of the flow of 
information, SNEs can play a major role in linking the European and the national 
level through their networks or “know-who” at both levels. To the extent that these 
networks are maintained, both the Commission and the member-state can benefit 
optimally from the “know-how” of SNEs. Furthermore, since networks are attached to 
persons, they can remain in tact when the secondment ends, which can make the 
benefits of the secondment period long-lasting. The lasting benefits can only be 
reaped, however, if SNEs return to their home organization and keep on working on 
Europe in positions where they can make use of their networks. 
Based on this premise, this chapter asks how the work of SNEs can be 
characterized as connectors between the national and European administration: Do 
they utilize their networks, rather as bridge-builders between the Commission and the 
member-state, or do they primarily act as national bridgeheads in the supranational 
Commission arena? Answers to a number of sub-questions are necessary to arrive at 
this insight:  
• To what extent do the SNEs rely on their national networks during their 
secondment? 
• For which purposes do they use their networks? 
• Do these networks endure? In other words, to what extent do the SNEs rely on 
their European network upon their return? 
• To what extent does the Dutch government exert substantive influence through 
its SNEs (by means of signaling and frontloading)? 
• To what extent is a period of secondment with the European Commission a 
route for career advancement for Dutch civil servants? 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First, the methodology and 
empirical data are presented. A short discussion of the secondment system will be 
followed by some remarks concerning the particularities of The Netherlands as a 
supplier of SNEs. We the answer our questions and conclude by reflecting on the 
implications of our findings for the effective use of SNEs as a strategic tool (as 
implied in chapter 3). 
 
 
5.2 Getting inside the insiders: methodology and data 
 
Empirical research focusing on seconded national experts is rare. The growing 
significance of SNEs within the Commission has only recently received attention in 
the literature, namely through the work of Jarle Trondal (2004, 2006a, 2006b). 
Trondal has been the first scholar to collect data on the SNEs. The sample of 
respondents he uses in his work includes mainly Swedish and Norwegian SNEs, and 
his work analyzes the identities and allegiances of these officials. We chose to 
concentrate on national experts from one member-state and arrive at valid results for 
this specific group. This also allowed us to explore to what extent SNEs fulfill their 
dual role of carrying expertise from the member-state to the Commission and from the 
Commission back to the member-state. 
The Netherlands presents an interesting case in this regard. Not only did it 
long enjoy a reputation as an enthusiastic subscriber to the ideal of an integrated 
Europe, as one of the founding members of the European Union it is a longstanding 
player in the secondment system. Secondly, its modest size makes it possible for 
researchers to identify and reach the whole population of current SNEs and a 
considerable share of the population of former SNEs for the period between 2001 and 
2005 (56%) with relative ease. Our dataset is composed of 90 Dutch national experts 
divided into two groups: one group of officials who are currently working as SNEs at 
the European Commission and one group of former SNEs who were seconded 
between 2001 and 2005.3 For both groups of respondents, we collected survey and 
interview data. The survey and interview questions have been adapted from Trondal’s 
SNE studies to Dutch SNEs. The aim of the survey has been to obtain an overview on 
the networks, positions, and careers of a large group of SNEs so as to follow up with 
in-depth interviews with a smaller group of SNEs on the major aspects that came to 
the fore through the surveys.  
The whole population of the current 62 Dutch SNEs has been contacted to 
participate in the survey4, out of which 46 have responded to our request, resulting in 
a 74% response rate. Hence we can be confident that our data for the current Dutch 
SNEs are representative (Babbie 1992, 267). In-depth interviews were conducted with 
eight of these officials, selected on the basis of the range of responses they gave, with 
the aim covering the broadest range with a small number of respondents.  
The former SNEs were reached using the snowballing method due to the 
absence of complete records. Out of the population of 91 former SNEs, we were able 
to contact 515, and 44 of the contacted former SNEs filled in the questionnaire (a 
response rate of 86%). The use of snowball rather than random sampling does not 
pose great problems for interpreting the results, since we only report frequencies, 
means, and medians in our analysis. In addition 20 in-depth interviews have been 
conducted with this group of respondents. The item non-response rate was low for the 
surveys, the poorest item-score equaling 78 respondents. The survey questions have 
been streamlined to enable comparison between the two groups of SNEs. The former 
SNEs have been asked questions regarding their secondment period and their current 
functions to enable cross-time comparisons.6  
 
 
5.3 Demand and supply: The Dutch and the expert secondment system  
 
The growing number of tasks accorded to the European level of governance over the 
years has brought up the need for more staff, which has led the European Commission 
to increasingly resort to external assistance through temporary employment 
arrangements, partly due to budgetary stringency and partly to changing agendas that 
require extra expertise. There are 22 543 officials working for the Commission, 6868 
of which are external or temporary staff.7 Seconded national experts number 1077 
officials, but their relative weight is better understood when one takes into 
consideration that their number equals 9.7% of the total number of  11 052 policy 
officials (Administrator/A-level officials), i.e. the highest level of Commission 
officials.  
  The primary aim of the secondment system is to bring in the high level of 
professional knowledge in a specific area of expertise and work experience in the 
member-state the national experts possess, especially in areas where such expertise is 
lacking inside the Commission rank and file. The potential benefit for the national 
administrations in return is that SNEs build up on their expertise at the 
European/international level while gaining insider knowledge on the institutional set-
up and functioning of the EU which they are presumed to take back to their 
administrations.  
SNEs are typically seconded from the administrations (national, regional, or 
local) of EU member-states, though the Commission also recruits experts from the 
private and voluntary sectors or international organizations where their expertise is 
needed. SNE vacancies are usually made public by informing the Permanent 
Representations of member-states in Brussels, which subsequently contact the 
respective national authorities. The recruiting Commission unit receives the 
applications of SNE candidates from the member-states, makes a shortlist and selects 
an SNE, usually as a result of an interview. The secondment lasts between six months 
and four years during which the SNE is remunerated by their home employer and 
receives compensation from the Commission for the extra costs incurred by living and 
working abroad.8 Whereas it is a relatively cheap manner to hire experts for the 
Commission, the Dutch government organizations, for instance, invests an estimated 
total of 3 million euros annually through continued salaries on seconded officials.9  
From the outset, SNEs have a double allegiance: they are employees of their 
home organization (financially and officially), but they work under the instructions of 
the European Commission. SNEs are obliged to behave solely in the interests of the 
Commission and not to accept any instructions or duties from their home government 
or organization. But they do not have the authority to represent the Commission or to 
enter into any commitments on behalf of the Commission.10 This double role is 
further exacerbated by the fact that the whole secondment system is based on the 
assumption that SNEs return to their home organization after the termination of their 
secondment. SNEs cannot escape the permanent balancing act this arrangement 
entails. As one interviewee stated: “The Commission is my boss, but I will go back, 
so I still take Dutch interests into consideration. For instance, I am careful with 
criticisms with regard to the Netherlands. On the other hand, the more you sound as a 
representative of the Netherlands, the less your authority in the Commission. So you 
have to be objective.”11  
 The Commission is organized primarily according to sector and function, 
which makes it structurally comparable to a national administration. What 
differentiates the Commission is its multinational staff. In order to prevent any 
particular nationalities from dominating the ranks of the Commission, the 
organization has from the beginning respected a “geographical balance” rule whereby 
the number of staff employed by the Commission reflects approximately the 
population size to ensure a legitimate composition. Dutch officials currently make up 
3.3% of the total and 4% of A-level officials of the Commission. The Netherlands has 
3.6% of the EU population and 4% of the weighted Council votes. Thus, the Dutch 
share of Commission officials is largely in proportion to its geographical entitlement. 
Until recently though, the Netherlands was under-represented within the Commission 
bureaucracy. This under-representation partially stemmed from the fact that the 
entrance exam for permanent officials, the concours, was difficult to pass for Dutch 
candidates, competitive examinations being unknown in the Dutch educational 
system. This led the Dutch government to take active measures aimed at increasing 
the number of Dutch officials, e.g. by introducing training courses for the concours 
and appointing an official to the Dutch EU Permanent Representation responsible for 
coordinating Dutch appointments to EU institutions.12
 Secondments meanwhile have been a safe way to secure Dutch posts. 
Furthermore, the secondment system allows the country to send the “right persons” to 
Brussels and to create a good image so that the Commission actually asks for Dutch 
SNEs.13 The Dutch SNE policy seems to have reached this target since the 
Netherlands is currently the home country of 62 SNEs to the European Commission, 
which makes up for the 5.8% of the SNE population. This, however, is not 
exclusively due to government strategy. There are two other factors that help to 
explain the relative overrepresentation of Dutch officials among SNEs: One is the 
proximity of the Netherlands to Belgium which makes it possible to keep one foot in 
the home country during the secondment. The personal lives of potential SNEs have 
to suffer less than those of their colleagues from further afield.14 Secondly and 
perhaps more important is the fact that the Netherlands has a high level of expertise in 
the fields sought for by the Commission, such as transport, research, environment, 
agriculture, phytosanitary issues, and financial markets.15 Table 5.1 indicates the 
distribution of respondent SNEs across policy areas and Commission DGs.  
 
POLICY 
AREA16
DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL 
FREQUENCY PERCENT
Market-oriented 
DG Competition 
DG Internal Market and 
Services 
DG Economic and Financial 
Affairs 
DG Enterprise 
Total 
9 
7 
4 
4 
24 
 
 
 
 
26.7% 
Social DG Environment 7  
Regulation DG Health and Consumer 
Protection 
DG Employment  
DG Justice 
DG Education and Culture 
Total 
5 
4 
4 
1 
21 
 
 
 
 
23.3% 
Supply side 
DG Transport and Energy 
DG Research 
DG Taxation and Customs 
Union 
DG Information Society and 
Media 
Total 
7 
5 
4 
3 
19 
 
 
 
 
21.1% 
Administration 
Eurostat 
DG Budget 
Secretariat-General 
Legal Service 
OLAF (European Anti-Fraud 
Office) 
Total 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
12.2% 
External affairs 
DG External Relations 
DG Trade 
DG Enlargement 
Total 
3 
3 
2 
8 
 
 
 
8.9% 
Provision 
DG Agriculture 
DG Development 
Total 
5 
2 
7 
 
 
7.8% 
  N= 90 100% 
TABLE 5.1 Commission Directorate-Generals as SNE Receivers 
 
It shows that half of the respondents were deployed within either the market-oriented 
or the social regulation DGs, and that the top 4 receiving DGs were DG Competition, 
DG Internal Market and Service, DG Environment and DG Transport and Energy.  
Looking at the ministries and agencies that provide SNEs, the percentages by 
policy area are somewhat different than the percentages per policy area for the 
receiving DGs. These differences are accounted for by the differences in 
organizational arrangements between the EU and Dutch central administration level.  
 
POLICY AREA MINISTRY FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Market-oriented FIN 
EZ 
NMA 
DNB 
Autoriteit Financiele Markten 
DNB 
EPTA 
13 
9 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 29 32.6% 
Provision LNV 
Productschap Akkerbouw 
Total 
14 
2 
16 
 
 
18.0% 
Social Regulation SoZaWe 
MinJus 
VROM 
VVS 
BNE Raad 
OCW 
EEA 
Total 
5 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.0% 
Supply side V&W 
Senter 
Sytens 
Agentschap Douane 
TNO 
Stichting FOM 
EurSciFoun 
Total 
9 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.9% 
External affairs BuZa 9 10.1% 
Administration CBS 
CPB 
Total 
3 
1 
4 
 
 
4.5% 
  N= 89 100% 
TABLE 5.2 Dutch Ministries and Agencies as SNE Providers 
 
Not surprisingly, the top five suppliers of SNEs are the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature and Food Safety, the Ministry of Finance (including the Dutch Tax and 
Customs Administration), the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
There is a clear parallel between the organizations that are key providers of 
SNEs and the organizations with the highest density of Europeanized civil servants 
(Chapter 2). Four out of the top five suppliers of SNEs feature in the cluster of 
“Eurocratic bulwarks”, the Ministry of Finance and the Tax Administration being the 
only exceptions as Eurocratic runners-up. This can be seen to strengthen the validity 
of the “league table of EU-ness” of Dutch public organizations presented in Chapter 
2. 
 
 
5.4 Profiling the Dutch expert contingent  
 
Who are the Dutch SNEs? Based on our survey and interview data, we construct a 
profile of Dutch SNEs, with respect to their education level, age and rank prior to 
secondment, and type of home organization.  
Based on the nature of the activities of SNE positions and on the interview 
responses, we infer that all SNEs are highly educated (HBO-level and up) and that the 
overwhelming majority holds a university degree (Bachelor/Master/PhD). Of the total 
group of respondents, 38% started their secondment at the age between 25 and 34, 
33% at the age between 35 and 44, 21% between 45 and 54, and 8% at an age of over 
55. The average age at the start of secondment was 40. This indicates that the Dutch 
government seconds predominantly young to middle-age officials who are 
presumably at the beginning or middle of their career. With respect to the rank of an 
SNE upon secondment, some interesting patterns can be observed, as shown in table 
5.3. 
 
 FORMER 
SNEs 
CURRENT 
SNEs TOTAL 
Higher civil servants (Ranks: 10-12) 28 
(66.7 %) 
24 
(58.5%) 
52 
(62.7%) 
Senior civil servants (Ranks: 13-14) 14 
(33.3%) 
12 
(29.3%) 
26 
(31.3%) 
Top civil servants (Ranks: 15-16) 0 
(0%) 
5 
(12.2%) 
5 
(6.0%) 
TOTAL 42 (100%) 41 (100%) 
N= 83 
(100%) 
TABLE 5.3 Ranks of Dutch SNEs at the time of secondment 17
 
63% of the SNEs were in ranks 10 to 12 just before the start of their secondment, 31% 
were in rank 13 or 14, and 6% were in ranks 15 and 16. The average prior rank among 
the total group of SNEs was 12.47. These figures seem to underline the assertion that 
EU-level activity among national civil servants is more the domain of middle-level 
civil servants than of top-ranking civil servants, (Noordegraaf, 2000; ‘t Hart et al. 
2002). The trend that the frequency of SNEs decrease as rank increases is largely 
explained by the fact that SNE positions are mostly policy-making posts, and policy 
preparation becomes increasingly less common as a main activity for civil servants in 
ranks 14 and beyond.18 In section 5.6 we return to the issue of rank, within the 
framework of the discussion on career development through the secondment system.  
In the previous section, we already indicated the distribution of SNEs in terms 
of their home organizations (Table 5.1). Introducing the dichotomy of executive 
agency vs. policy department (see also Chapter 2), we observe that 76% of all 
respondents were originating from policy departments, and 24% from executive 
agencies. Apart form the fact that part of this difference is explained by the fact that 
most SNE positions are policy positions and much fewer are executive positions, 
assuming that the share of SNEs delivered by each type of organization is a valid 
indicator of EU-involvement, our findings are analogous with the conclusion in 3.3.2, 
namely that policy departments are more involved in EU-affairs than executive 
agencies.  
With respect to the duration of the secondment, we observe that 17% of the 
SNEs were seconded for less than a year, 34% for a period between 1 and 2 years, 
30% between 2 and 3 years, and 19% between 3 and 4 years.19 So, the large majority 
of SNEs stays at the Commission for about two years. A two-year stay is bound to 
provide enough time to provide substantive contribution to work in the Commission 
and to constitute a substantial improvement for the individual SNE in terms of skills 
and knowledge on the EU. If we consider the fact that 49% of the Dutch SNEs stay 
between 2 to 4 years in the Commission, this period of time is presumably also 
enough to build a network at the EU if not at the transnational level. Does the 
secondment period translate into returns for the SNEs and the Dutch government in 
terms of networks and knowledge and can the Dutch SNEs exchange their value-
added for better career opportunities which involve them using this EU know-who 
and know-how?   
 
 
5.5 Knowing how and knowing who: networking 
 
We borrow our definitions of transnational policy networks from the multi-level 
governance literature where the role of informal bargaining between a very wide 
variety of actors (individuals and institutions, public and private, local, regional, 
national, European, international) is suggested to be at least as decisive as formal 
power relations (Scharpf 1994, Hooghe 1996, Marks et al. 1996, Goetz and Hix 2001, 
Jordan 2001, Peters and Pierre 2001). Policy networks are defined here as “more or 
less stable sets of public and private organizational actors, linked to each other by 
communication and by the exchange of resources, such as information and expertise” 
(Jönsson et al. 1998,  326). They consist of the contacts, ties and connections between 
actors that develop as a complement to formal institutional relations. The emergence 
of these networks is conditional upon the development of personal relations between 
relevant actors, which in turn depends on their frequency of interaction. As such, 
policy networks bring together individuals originating from different fields of 
knowledge and social environments.  
The significance of policy networks within the EU governance is twofold: 
‘know-how’ and ‘know-who’, i.e. an actor needs to have thorough substantive 
knowledge, as well as knowledge of the organizations, procedures, and individuals 
who shape the policy environment (Jönsson and Strömvik 2005, 18). Furthermore, 
these networks are transnational and involving both governmental and non-
governmental policy actors. Experts may be linked with one another by means of 
vertical (i.e. across levels of governance), horizontal (i.e. across policy sectors and/or 
across government, corporate and research organizations) and potentially also 
diagonal (i.e. cutting through both vertical and horizontal orderings) relations 
(Slaughter 2004, see also Chapter 1). These poly-lateral network links allow 
bureaucrats at various levels of governance to prepare and implement policies assisted 
by organized interests supplying technically relevant expertise. This is the essence of 
network governance (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999).  
To investigate to what extent SNEs form a bridge between their own member-
state and the European Commission, we asked both groups of SNEs questions 
involving the frequency of their reliance on their network in the Netherlands and the 
Commission. A majority of current Dutch SNEs (53.3%) reported drawing on the 
network they built in the Netherlands before their secondment once a week. 47.7% 
said they were approached monthly by their former colleagues at the Dutch 
organization they worked for. Only 18.2% of the former SNEs were approached 
weekly and 34.1% monthly by their former colleagues during their secondment 
period. Clearly, the current Dutch SNEs have more frequent contacts with their 
network in the Netherlands. Their contacts also involve sending written information to 
their home organization – 53.3% have such contacts monthly. 
  What does this network entail though? To what extent do SNEs build up and 
are part of transnational networks extending to different administrative levels in 
different member-states, to non-state players, and other EU and international 
organizations? Or are they just individual bridges between the Commission and the 
member-state they come from? And, since policy networks are assumed to be 
relatively stable and persistent: What happens to these networks after the secondment 
period? To what extent do the bridges remain intact? 
 
Who’s in the loop? 
 
We first look at the frequency of SNE contacts across different levels and actors. 
Since the scale employed does not have equal intervals, we use the median to compare 
the results. 
 
Survey Questions: 
 Current SNEs: How frequently do you have work-related contacts and/or 
meetings with the following during your secondment?  
 Former SNEs: How frequently did you have work-related contacts and/or 
meetings with the following during your secondment? / How frequently do you 
have work-related contacts and/or meetings with the following in your current 
function? 
 
Answer categories: Once per day=5, Once per week=4, Once per month=3, Once per 
year=2, Never=1 
 
 
Median: 
Current 
SNEs 
Median: 
Former SNEs 
during 
secondment 
Median: 
Former 
SNEs in 
current 
function 
Colleagues within other DGs20 4 4 
SNE’s from:                                             
- The Netherlands 3 3 
- Other member-states 4 4 
 
321
Other EU institutions 3 3 2 
Other international organizations  3 3 2 
The Dutch EU Permanent 
Representation 3 3 1 
EU Permanent Representations of 
other member-states 2 2 1 
Dutch national administration:                 
- Own policy sector 4 3 4 
- Other policy sectors 2 2 3 
National administrations of other 
member-states:  
- Own policy sector 
3 3 2 
- Other policy sectors 1 1 1 
Representatives of regional 
governments from:     
- The Netherlands 
1 1 1 
 - Other member-states 1 1 1 
Representatives of local governments 
from: 
- The Netherlands 
1 1 1 
- Other member-states 1 1 1 
Representatives of the private sector 
from:  
- The Netherlands 
3 3 3 
- Other member-states 2.5 2 1 
Representatives of NGOs from:    
- The Netherlands 1 2 1 
- Other member-states 1 2 1 
Universities or research institutes 
from:    
- The Netherlands 
2 2 2 
- Other member-states 2 2 1 
TABLE 5.4 Frequency of Dutch SNE contacts 
 
If we concentrate on the medians higher than 2, since this gives the most regular 
contacts, we see that there are actually only a few actors which fall into this category. 
The most frequent contacts are within the Commission and with the Dutch national 
administration within officials’ own policy sector. Other EU institutions, international 
organizations, the Dutch EU Permanent Representation, and sectoral contacts with 
other member-states are the most forthcoming contact points in the supranational and 
national arena. The non-governmental aspect in the SNE networks is occupied by 
Dutch and to a lesser extent by European business.  
 The figures for contacts of past SNEs during their secondment follow the same 
pattern with a few exceptions.22 When we turn to the network patterns of former 
SNEs in their current function, however, we see that these cluster predominantly 
within the Dutch national administration. The Commission and Dutch business figure 
as the other most forthcoming network partners. The results clearly show that the only 
lasting supranational networks of SNEs are within the Commission.  
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these observations. The SNE 
secondment system does stimulate the formation of transnational networks, but 
applying these data to the three types of network relations set out in this article, we 
see that the network connections fall largely under the vertical dimension of network 
relations, to a lesser degree under the horizontal dimension, and only to a very limited 
extent under the diagonal dimension of network relations. Therefore, the SNEs do 
indeed form bridges between the Commission and the member-state and provide a 
channel of flow of information, ideas, and contacts.  
 
Networking as strategic behavior 
 
How do the SNEs fulfill this bridging function in practice though? Of the three 
avenues for strategic behavior available to member states governments, signaling, 
frontloading and coalition-building introduced in Chapter 3, SNEs play a significant 
role in the former two. Especially in the pre-proposal stage, SNEs can use their 
position within the Commission and the wider networks to influence the content of 
proposals-to-be.23 As one SNE emphasized, “Apart from the SNEs, The Hague has no 
access whatsoever to what happens in the beginnings stage of the legislation process 
in the Commission.”24  
SNEs facilitate signaling in the sense that they offer easy access points for 
national civil servants and officials at the Permanent Representation to make certain 
national interests or concerns known within the Commission apparatus and vice versa. 
When Dutch government officials are looking for an access point within the 
Commission, they first search for a fellow-national to talk to.25 This means that SNEs 
fulfill a role of switchboard within the Commission. Roughly the half of the former 
SNEs and the majority of the current SNEs (63% of the interview respondents) 
indicate that they were relatively frequently used as an “EU helpdesk” for the 
members of their home organizations. They describe their role as “feeler”, “resonance 
box”, “ambassador” “antenna”, “brainstorming partner” but also as “missionary” and 
“infiltrator” for their home organization.  
The practice of signaling rests on trust-based reciprocity, and the necessary 
level of trust can be stemming from a common nationality or previous trust-generating 
interactions. In this sense, the networks of SNEs make the flow of information 
between the Commission and the member-state possible:  
I have personal contacts with my former colleagues. My Ministry will first 
speak with me. I think through issues with colleagues who call me. The other 
way around, when there is a new strategy I will first sound out ideas with 
colleagues in the Netherlands in order to use existent knowledge in the 
Netherlands within the Ministries.26
 
Signaling can thus work in two directions: 
Your SNE position makes it possible to notify colleagues at home, so that they 
can anticipate on the course of action of the Commission. For instance, they 
can prematurely prepare sabotage strategies, prepare proposals for amendment 
or forge alliances. In some cases the timing of a member-state entering the 
policy game, is decided by the SNE.27
 
In terms of the Commission, both the network and the experience of the SNE at the 
national level are valuable for the Commission since: 
The permanent officials do not need to have any experience or network at the 
national administration. This is the value-added of an SNE. The Commission 
at the end of the day aims at the member-states, so it is important to have a 
network within the member-states. Furthermore, the officials do not know 
about practice. As an SNE, you know a lot about what happens on the ground 
in practice. That is a big asset. You just know how it works and how it is 
implemented.28  
 
It is in the Commission’s interest to know what is at stake in the member-state.29 In 
turn, if the information channeled into the Commission which is relevant and 
interesting to the Commission may thus be used as input to a proposal.  
With respect to frontloading, the importance of SNEs is even more crucial, 
given that the appointment of SNEs within a specific DG is the central instrument for 
this type of strategic behavior. That the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, among others, 
sends its officials to strategic positions in the Commission, as argued in Chapter 3, 
finds support in the account of an SNE seconded by this ministry: 
Your influence depends on your position. I work in the field of phytosanitary 
and veterinary trade barriers. Of course, the Netherlands has a strategic interest 
there. It is interesting to see how the Commission deals with this issue. As an 
exporting country, it is very important to have someone at such a strategic 
position within the Commission, both for the Netherlands and for my own 
Ministry.30  
 
In short: strategic appointments in view of certain important dossiers are a pivotal 
method of frontloading.  
The other two mechanisms through which frontloading is secured as a 
strategic route are (a) through instructions by superiors and (b) as a result of the 
natural national-cultural perspective taken by the SNE in question on the policy-issue. 
Dutch SNEs claim that they do not receive any instructions from the Dutch 
government in contrast to SNEs of other member-states: 
There are countries with an SNE policy. The UK sends instructions and 
influences opinion-building with position papers. The French SNEs are also 
followed up. The Netherlands does less. You can sometimes see the national 
position per chance in a newsletter.31
Whereas some SNEs think they should exert national influence, some think that the 
influence should be exercised by the Dutch Permanent Representation instead.32 In 
that sense, some SNEs seem to totally endorse their Commission identity: “Expertise 
is the most important. We are not the member-state representatives here. They are in 
the Council.”33  
Still, secondment system gives the member-state the opportunity to support 
EU-files with its own people.34 This happens through the direct involvement of SNEs 
in the Commission. Through working in their field of responsibility and their file with 
their “Dutch profile”, they can “make the Dutch voice heard in Brussels.”35 This is 
actually what our Dutch SNE respondents view as the frontloading method which is 
much more common and much more appropriate in terms of exercising influence. The 
Ministry does not need to dictate SNEs since they already have an indirect influence 
by means of “thinking as a Dutchman”.36 This is also a transparent way since the 
proposal drafted by a Dutch SNE still needs to go through all the official EU 
procedures. Thus, this viewpoint gets locked into the proposal and might be altered at 
points, but the general spirit rarely changes substantially. In other words, the first 
blow is half the battle, and SNEs play a pivotal role in enabling member states to 
strike that first blow. 
With respect to the contribution to the policy process, the nationality of an 
SNE matters in the way of thinking37: “Even though you do not get a substantive 
mandate, what you bring to the table in the policy making process is a Dutch point of 
view on the policy issue in question.”38 As another SNE phrased it:  
The SNE brings in his own experience, way of thinking, and problem solving 
strategy to the Commission, all of which have been developed a specific 
framework, the situation in the home country. Once you are faced with real 
policy issues at the Commission, the first reflex is fall back on the old 
routines. As time goes by he may place matters in a wider, more European 
framework, but still the SNE’s prior experience (or even the tradition he 
comes from) remains to play a large role.39
 
Furthermore, many SNEs reported that while they were seconded, they 
continued following the Dutch media (newspapers, television etc.) and that for a 
considerable part, their social life remained centered in the Netherlands and not so 
much in Brussels. As a result of the stronger links SNEs have to their home country 
compared to permanent Commission officials, SNEs are also better able to reflect the 
stakes of a member-state and to anticipate national policy positions.40 An interesting 
distinction made by both current and the former SNEs is between the Dutch 
permanent Commission officials and SNEs. Permanent Dutch officials have 
reportedly far less direct contact with officials at the national administration level than 
SNEs. At the same time, SNEs perceive permanent officials as being more 
independent in terms of their member-state. This seems to indicate that the width and 
depth of an official’s network in the member-state does not depend so much on the 
official’s nationality, but more on whether the official is pre-socialized in a national 
context and whether the official is legally bound to the national administration.    
One SNE responded that the national perspective taken by the SNE serves the 
benefit of the Commission, too:  
It is very common to bring the problems or position form your member state 
of origin to the fore. I was also regularly approached by other Commission 
civil servants, when they wanted to put out their feelers in the early stage 
about whether or not a specific proposal would be greeted with enthusiasm by 
The Netherlands. So, the presence of SNEs makes the policy process smoother 
and quicker because SNEs are normally well aware of national positions.41
 
However, it should be noted that the mere presence of SNEs within the various DGs 
does not automatically lead to a successful outcome and that the degree of success is 
contingent on the degree of coordination of SNE activity from the national department 
and the effectively of the SNE in mobilizing his or her network to influence the 
authors of a policy proposal. From this follows that member-states have the 
opportunity to impact the policy-making process if they can second their civil servants 
purposefully and strategically. The Dutch government does seem to have adopted 
such a strategic approach with the aim of becoming more present in the EU through 
building and sharing experience through the secondment system.42
Yet, roughly half of the former SNEs reported that there was not enough 
interest on the part of their seconding organization for the potential gains the 
secondment could have for these organizations. “Out of sight, out of mind”, was a 
very frequent description of the perceived attitude of the sending organization towards 
the SNE during the secondment. Many expressed that they had to take the initiative of 
contacting their home ministry, and that the Ministry did not make enough use of their 
presence in the Commission. The situation might be changing though: Our data 
signals a difference between the current and the former SNEs in terms of the degree of 
contact between the home organization and the SNE during secondment (see Table 4). 
It seems that the contacts between an SNE and the home organization have indeed 
increased over the past years. A second conceivable explanation for this variation is 
the potential propensity by officials to think more positively about ‘the relationship 
with their home organization during their secondment’ while they are seconded than 
after their return, given that many respondents were disappointment by the treatment 
they received from their home organizations after return, which often seems to be the 
case as the following sections suggest. 
 
Do SNE networks persist?  
 
The empirical evidence above demonstrates the bridging function of seconded 
officials during their secondment. However, the lasting effects of the secondment 
system can only be assessed by addressing the question whether the bridge remains 
intact after the secondment. Using the knowledge acquired and the network built 
during the secondment is the most crucial pay off of the secondment system for the 
member-state government:  “When you know the internal procedures of the EU, you 
can anticipate instead of react. Through your network in the Commission, you can 
keep on anticipating. This is perhaps more important. The Ministries get more of an 
understanding of what can be done and what not.”43
Several respondents observed that building up and maintaining a network with 
people at the Commission level is easier than maintaining a network with officials at 
the national level. The organizational culture at the Commission level is apparently 
more open to establishing longer term professional and social contacts than the 
organizational culture in their Dutch home organizations.44 Since not all SNEs are 
originating from the Dutch central government, but also from agencies and semi-
governmental institutions, the secondment system can also help to create networks 
between the SNE and governmental actors at the national level, which may become 
opportune once the secondment has ended.  
What appears predominantly from our findings, however, is that although the 
expertise from the Dutch ministries/authorities flows largely to the Commission, the 
Dutch administration does not always get the EU expertise back. The bridge is often 
one-way: only 27 of 43 (62.8%) of former SNEs in our sample work for the 
organization they used to work for before their secondment.45   
Consequently, the network ties also seem to get weaker once an SNE returns – 
27.5% of the former SNEs state that they use the network they built during their 
secondment in their current function once per month while another 25% use it only 
once per year, and 17.5% do not use their Commission network at all.  
It is also striking that current SNEs expressed relatively high hopes with 
regard to the degree to which they will be able to professionally utilize their networks, 
while the majority of former SNEs demonstrated their disappointment with respect to 
the extent they actually use their acquired networks in their jobs after their 
secondment. Given that many former SNEs also reported that they had considerable 
expectations in this respect before and during their secondment, we interpret this 
difference as an indication of overly optimistic prospects on the part of current SNEs 
rather than an indication of the increase in opportunities to use acquired networks 
upon return to the home administration. 
During the interviews with former SNEs, many respondents indicated that 
their networks within and if applicable outside of the Commission had become 
outdated and were therefore of little or no use anymore. This is remarkable, since the 
secondments of the respondents had ended an average of only two years ago. In most 
cases the reason for their network being outdated was the fact that their first job after 
the secondment did not require the use of their network. A considerable part of these 
respondents mentioned that while professionally they made little to no use of their 
established networks, they did perpetuate contacts with the individuals they used to 
work with during their secondment, but rather on a personal or social level.  
Some of these respondents, whose current job did not enable them to make 
formal professional use of their networks, did indicate that the personal contacts they 
still have with their network yields them information that may not be directly relevant 
to the job they are fulfilling, but which nonetheless is interesting for their 
organization. They are convinced that their colleagues for whose jobs this information 
would be directly relevant do not get the same information as timely: “Through my 
network at the Commission I get information about issues that no one else within my 
organization has access to.”46 and “It is always nice to have more or earlier 
information on an issue than for instance your boss has. Because I know a number of 
people at the Commission, I get this informational advantage vis-à-vis my boss.”47 
These respondents reported that the added value in terms of networks falls to them 
personally and only in an indirect – and therefore sub-optimal – way to their 
organization.  
Others who felt their network had to some extent diluted, indicated that a large 
part of their network had by now left Brussels as well, and that they did not have new 
contact information of these people. Nevertheless, respondents who indicated that 
their network had become outdated did acknowledge that due to their secondment and 
their familiarity with the structures of the Commission, they would now have an 
advantage in building up a new network if their job would require it.  
On the contrary, former SNEs whose present job did connect well with their 
professional duties at the Commission reported that the benefits of their acquired 
network were substantial. This points to a positive relation between on the one hand 
the degree of compatibility between the job SNEs fulfilled during secondment and the 
job they perform after return, and on the other hand the degree to which officials have 
been able to maintain their networks and utilize it professionally.  
 
 
5.6 Life after secondment: SNE’s and their careers  
 
If the Dutch government wants to obtain benefits for the investment made on the 
SNEs not only during but after their secondment, one would expect it to engage in 
proactive career planning for the SNEs’ return. The reality is murky. To start with, 
since only 62.8% actually return, it is clear that the current “return guarantee” is not 
sufficient to assure that this actually happens.  
SNE interviewees point to a gap between the expectations built up in Brussels 
and the reality faced upon return in The Hague. The high expectations stem from the 
fact that the SNEs feel that they grow enormously during the secondment. They 
expect to be rewarded for this when they return. The reality is often different, so much 
so that current SNEs tend to be concerned about their future based on their knowledge 
of their predecessors’ fates after return:  
Return policy is an important issue. SNEs gain substantive and practical 
knowledge within the EU institutions here. Currently there is no management 
as to what happens after. Secondment is not a promotion. Until now, SNEs 
have not been rewarded upon return. They have been promoted away. Now 
that the number of SNEs is doubled, it is time to consolidate the return policy. 
It has to be good for your career.48
 
Yet in terms of their national careers, secondment entails stagnation, since SNEs 
remain in the same rank during the whole period regardless of their personal growth. 
Returning home to the same job and rank thus constitutes a relative opportunity loss 
for many who would otherwise have had a chance to rise through the ranks.49 
Simultaneously, the peer colleagues at the Ministry in The Hague continue to grow in 
terms of career and rank, and they are still visible for the Ministry whereas the SNE in 
Brussels becomes also “out of sight and out of mind” in terms of the career planning. 
In the words of an SNE: “In the Netherlands, they are not sitting and waiting for you. 
They say: ‘Are you still alive? We have to find something for you.’ So it is not good 
for your career in the Netherlands.”50
The fears of the current SNEs find life in the experience of former SNEs. One 
observation seems to represent the sentiments of a large number of former SNEs: 
Beforehand I expected that the secondment would offer me additional career 
opportunities, but as it turned out, this was by no means the case. For those 
who managed to get a permanent position with the Commission afterwards, it 
has obviously paid off. But all the people I know that have been seconded, are 
disappointed in terms of the supposed advantage that they were to get out of 
their secondment. No wonder that most of them leave within a year after they 
have returned to work elsewhere where their Brussels experience did get 
valued.51
 
Asked whether former SNEs believed that being seconded had offered them any 
additional career advancement, 51% answered negatively and 49% answered 
positively.52
Comparing the present rank of former SNEs with the rank they possessed just 
before being seconded, it turns out that among those who were seconded within the 
period 2000-2005, 57% was still in the same rank, 29% had moved up one rank, and 
11% had moved up two ranks (the remaining 3% represents one person who had 
moved down one rank). In other words, of the former SNEs included in our study, 
60% had not made a significant promotion, either during or just after completion of 
the secondment. The average upward mobility among this group during an average 
period of 3.75 years was 0.49 rank. Although we have not been able to compare this 
figure with national civil servants of the same age, educational level, and organization 
in the same period, this rate of upward mobility is by no means spectacular.  
As long as this image is sustained and there is no concrete career planning, the 
SNEs take the next steps in their career, and the chance that they go back becomes 
small. Returning back to their old position does not offer enough challenges which 
automatically stimulates the search for other alternatives, be it in Brussels or in the 
private sector in the Netherlands. 
 
 RETURN to PREVIOUS 
ORGANIZATION 
 
Frequency 
CURRENT SECTOR Yes No (Percent) 
Public 25 4 29 (67.4%) 
Semi-public 2 3 5 (11.6%) 
Private  0 4 4 (9.3%) 
Public international (Commission, 
IO) 
0 3 3 (7.0%) 
None (Retired) 0 2 2 (4.7%) 
TOTAL 27 (62.8%) 16 (27.2%) N= 43 
TABLE 5.5 SNEs’ return rate after secondment 
 
As the figures for the former SNEs show, SNEs who do not return to their home 
organization make a career move in various directions, in the public and private 
sector. 
 One remarkable exception here is the exception of the Ministry of Agriculture 
SNEs. Namely, this “Eurocratic bulwark” Ministry scores very well in terms of 
recruiting its SNEs back: out of the 8 Agriculture SNEs, 7 of them are still working 
for their ministry. Interviewees pointed out that the Ministry of Agriculture does have 
a more consistent policy regarding their SNEs. Whereas some of them did end up in 
the same position, some of the SNEs have indeed obtained a promotion at a position 
that matched their profile.53 The ministry’s reputation as a true “Eurocratic bulwark” 
(see Chapter 2) therefore also applies to its management of the careers of its SNEs.  
On the whole, however, a secondment with the Commission can hardly be 
seen as a route for career advancement for the officials involved. Being seconded 
actually had a negative career effect, at least for those SNEs who were seconded in 
the early 2000s. This is not a typical Dutch phenomenon: A survey among former 
SNEs of all various member-states conducted in 2002 show that problems with regard 
to career development are a general phenomenon associated with the secondment 
system.54  
 
 
5.7 An underutilized asset: Conclusions 
 
Our empirical data on the Dutch former and current SNEs show that SNEs do form 
bridges between the EU and the member-state through their role in forming and 
sometimes in maintaining policy networks in EU governance. These contacts between 
the Commission and national ministries allow the member-state to signal and 
frontload its positions and viewpoints into the policy proposals of the Commission 
through its SNEs. This, however, should not be interpreted as a direct national 
influence. Firstly, the Commission welcomes the experience, networks, and input of 
the SNEs since the success of policy proposals depend after all on the member-states. 
SNEs also stress that they remain loyal to the Commission during their secondment. 
Secondly, the influence is rather exercised indirectly through the thought processes of 
the SNEs which they characterize as having been shaped by their national background 
and upbringing. Thirdly, there is a whole chain of command before the draft proposal 
of the SNE reaches the top of the Commission where parts of the proposal might be 
modified. Finally, besides the distinction between national or EU interests, the role of 
expertise itself may be a third variable of significance. Transnational networks of 
experts, in which SNEs participate, can imply distinct normative policy preferences. 
Although this study does not take this factor into account, future contributions in this 
field could benefit from the inclusion of the role of expertise as a source of 
substantive preferences. On the whole, though, secondment seems to remain a 
legitimate and valued system of exchange of officials both for the Commission and 
the member-states.   
Our study has also demonstrated, however, that not all hopes placed in the 
secondment system are fulfilled: the long-term benefit of these networks is often 
rather limited, which can be seen as an opportunity loss for the seconding member-
states. Many former SNEs do get jobs that require them to draw on their Commission 
networks; many of them do not return to their original home organization. 
Since networks are bound to individuals rather than to positions within an 
organization, the enhanced trust and frank exchange may persist after a change of 
position. The conditions under which this persistence is more or less likely to occur 
remains uncultivated research territory. By constantly and increasingly sending out 
national experts to the supranational level and subsequently reabsorbing these experts 
back into the national administration, these networks can facilitate decision-making 
(see Beyers and Kerremans 2004). 
In this chapter we have identified a number of mechanisms through which the 
SNE can potentially play a linking role between the Commission and the member-
state. The secondment system does indeed facilitate information flows and in specific 
cases influence, in an intricate web of relations across the formal institutional 
structures of the EU and its member-states. The results of the Dutch case show, 
however, that the SNEs are not optimally utilized. Even though the recent efforts of 
the Dutch government have led to increased levels of contact between the SNEs and 
their ‘home base’, there is still room for improvement. As for the extent to which the 
benefits of the secondment system last after the secondment period, the career paths 
of the officials following their secondment are a crucial factor. At present, expertise 
and networks fade quickly as experts, quite literally, ‘move on.’ Better career 
planning for the SNEs would prevent this from happening and maximize the benefits 
for the member-state. 
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